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2000] WEAPONS TO FIGHT INSIDER TRADING 
 
“Fault should be a requirement for punishment.” 
Benjamin N. Cardozo1 
 
WEAPONS TO FIGHT INSIDER TRADING IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  
A CALL FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 16(B)2 
 
by 
 
Michael H. Dessent* 
 
Does it make legal sense that a corporate officer who bought and sold 
shares in his own company within a six-month period at an accounting loss, with 
no intent to deceive, can be sued to give up her nonexistent “profits”?  Should 
the so-called aggrieved plaintiff be entitled to recover if he was not even a 
shareholder at the time of the defendant’s stock trades and had never even 
heard of the corporation until his lawyer told him to buy that stock?3  Should a 
judgment for that plaintiff be allowed if he purchased only one share of stock in 
that corporation just before filing suit?  What if he is seeking only a negligible 
                                                 
1  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). Then Chief 
Judge Cardozo (later U.S. Supreme Court Justice), explained the position of the 
prestigious New York Court of Appeals in the context that criminal statutes should 
require some knowledge that a criminal act was morally wrong: 
In the light of all these precedents, it is impossible . . . to say that 
there is any decisive adjudication which limits the word “wrong” in the 
statutory definition to legal as opposed to moral wrong.  The trend of 
the decisions is indeed the other way.  The utmost that can be said 
is that the question is still an open one.  We must, therefore, give 
that construction to the statute which seems to us most consonant 
with reason and justice. 
People v.  Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 338 (1915). 
2  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) [hereinafter 
Section 16(b)]. 
*  Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.  The author 
wishes to thank Sunny Nassim and Mary-Ellen Norvell for their excellent assistance 
with this article. 
3  A case illustrating this principle is Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), 
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). 
In this decision the defendant was ordered to pay $300,000 to the corporation 
for the "profits" he earned over several six-month periods.  Id. at 52.  In actuality he 
had incurred a taxable loss of $400,000. The court followed Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 
136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943), which stated that to give section 16(b) its full effect, 
the calculation would be the shares with the lowest purchase price, matched against 
those with the highest sale prices.  Id. at 237 & n.11.  Thus, they would ignore any 
losses which may be actualized.  Id. at 238. 
1
Dessent: Weapons to Fight Insider Trading
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
 
share of the recovery himself, while his attorney in the action can receive 
several thousand dollars?4 
 
Finally, is it legally “right”5 that over 66 years of comprehensive 
securities litigation involving Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,6 and its Rule 10(b)5,7 have led to well-defined standards of such unique 
concepts of “duty,” “breach,” “ scienter,” “ causation,”  “reliance,” 
“misappropriation” and “materiality” for insider trading,8 but none of that 
matters in a § 16(b) case? 
 
It is the position of this paper that § 16(b)9 needs to be repealed.  That 
statute puts blame on innocent people and essentially legalizes champerty.10  
Adequate standards have been created by which culpability for insider trading 
can be determined and society protected.11  Equally important, the high 
likelihood of champerty, and the total lack of merit and standing of most 
individual plaintiffs, coupled with the Supreme Court’s recent U.S. v. O’Hagan12 
decision, give Congress a marvelous opportunity to repeal the statute while still 
carrying out its original legislative purpose.13   
 
Sections I and II of this paper consist of an examination of Section 16(b) 
and the intent of Congress in establishing this section.  It further discusses the 
policy behind Congress’ allowance of non-owners of the security at the time of 
the “short swing” transaction to establish standing to sue by acquiring the 
                                                 
4  Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
351 U.S. 972 (1956). 
5  For judicial definitions of that word in a criminal context, see Tenement House Dept. 
v.  McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 163 (1915); People on Inf. of Price v. Sheffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25 (1918). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). 
7  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).   
8  For the most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision discussing these terms, see 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
9  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
10  “A bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger 
pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds.” 
 NATHAN M.  CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE 
PROFESSION 273 (1996).  Also relates to general term of “maintenance”- “maintaining, 
supporting, or promoting the litigation of another.”  See also BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 
157 (6th ed. 1991). 
11  See generally United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
12  Id. 
13  The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously struggled over the propriety of strict 
liability in criminal law.  See e.g., United States v. Parks, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United 
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
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security even after the alleged transaction has taken place. 
 
Sections III through VI discuss the abuses by attorneys in making large 
profits in connection with Section 16(b) cases.  In this section it will be shown 
that the practice of receiving such large attorney’s fees is actually long-
standing.  Gollust v. Mendell14 is the most recent case addressing this issue.  
However, there is a history of cases which date back as early as the 1940s.  
This section will also consider the issues of contingent fee agreements and 
champerty and how these compensation practices may facilitate the self 
interest of attorneys who initiate Section 16(b) suits.  Lastly, this section will 
deal with the issues of solicitation and whether attorneys who find someone to 
purchase the security of the “issuer” (such as friends or family) for the sole 
purpose of initiating a law suit are acting ethically. 
 
Section VII discusses possible solutions to the problems associated with 
Section 16(b) actions, including other alternatives to the problems associated 
with instituting a Section 16(b) suit.  One such solution may be to amend 
Section 16(b) to permit, as plaintiffs, only those who are shareholders at the 
time of the alleged trade.  In the alternative, the United States v. O’Hagan 
decision,15 may offer a solution, thereby determining that there may no longer 
be a need for Section 16(b).  It concludes with a focus on a contemporary view 
of the intent and purpose of Section 16(b), and discusses what measures could 
be taken to cure the ongoing problems associated with this Section. 
 
 I.  THE FACTUAL SETTING 
 
Imagine two different hypotheticals which might occur in today's stock 
markets.  In the first, a corporate officer in a publicly traded corporation obtains 
confidential, non-disclosed material information regarding an upcoming merger 
of his business.  He decides that this would be the perfect opportunity to make 
a sizable profit by purchasing stock in his company, the price of  which he 
knows is likely to soar when news of the proposed merger is disclosed 
publicly.16  The officer purchases the stock.  A few weeks later, an appropriate 
                                                 
14  501 U.S. 115 (1991), aff’g 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990). 
15  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
16  NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.05 202.06 (The 
Exchange 1992).  
202.05 Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments 
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or 
information which it might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for 
its securities.  This is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the 
listing agreement which the company enters into with the Exchange. 
A listed company should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which 
result in unusual market activity or price variations. 
3
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202.06 Procedure for Public Release of Information 
(A) Immediate Release Policy 
The normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a 
press release.  This may be either by telephone or in written form.  Any release of 
information that could reasonably be expected to have an impact on the market for a 
company’s securities should be given to the wire services and the press For 
Immediate Release. . . . 
(B) Telephone Alert to the Exchange 
When the announcement of news of a material event or a statement dealing 
with a rumor which calls for immediate release is made shortly before the opening or 
during market hours (presently 9:30 A.M. to 5.00 P.M., New York time), it is 
recommended that the company’s Exchange representative be notified by telephone at 
least ten minutes prior to release of the announcement to the news media.  If the 
Exchange receives such notification in time, it will be in a position to consider 
whether, in the opinion of the Exchange, trading in the security should be temporarily 
halted.  A delay in trading after the appearance of the news on the Dow Jones or 
Reuters news wires provides a period of calm for public evaluation of the 
announcement. . . .  A longer delay in trading may be necessary if there is an unusual 
influx of orders.  The Exchange attempts to keep such interruptions in the continuous 
auction market to a minimum.  However, where events transpire during market hours, 
the overall importance of fairness to all those participating in the market demands that 
these procedures be followed. 
(C) Release to Newspapers and News Wire Services 
News which ought to be the subject of immediate publicity must be released 
by the fastest available means.  The fastest available means may vary in individual 
cases and according to the time of day.  Ordinarily, this requires a release to the 
public press by telephone, telegraph, or hand delivery, or some combination of such 
methods.  Transmittal of such a release to the press solely by mail is not considered 
satisfactory.  Similarly, release of such news exclusively to the local press outside of 
New York City would not be sufficient for adequate and prompt disclosure to the 
investing public. 
To insure adequate coverage, releases requiring immediate publicity should be 
given to Dow Jones & Company, Inc., and to Reuters Economic Services. 
Companies are also encouraged to promptly distribute their releases to 
Associated Press and United Press International as well as to newspapers in New 
York City and in cities where the company is headquartered or has plants or other 
major facilities. . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In 1970, the SEC issued a general release relating to the disclosure of material 
corporate developments.  See SEC comment on Timely Disclosure of Material 
Corporate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, Exchange Act Release 
No. 8995, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970).  See also 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN,  THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (3d ed., 1996) (citing 
ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935-1975 
4
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formal announcement about the upcoming merger is made.  As anticipated by 
the officer, the corporation's stock price doubles quickly.  The officer then sells 
his newly acquired stock for a multi-million dollar profit. 
 
In the second hypothetical, a corporate officer, also in a publicly traded 
corporation, buys 1000 shares of stock in her company to help fund her child's 
education.  She purchases that stock for $100.00 per share.  Five months 
later, she is compelled to sell these shares to meet a medical emergency for 
the child.  Fortunately, during those five months, the price per share for the 
corporation's stock has increased from $100.00 to $175.00 per share.  While 
the officer possessed knowledge of material, non-public information, she did 
not base her decision to purchase or sell on that news. 
 
When comparing these situations, it seems appropriate that the officer 
in the first example should be subject to discipline because he was engaging in 
insider trading, using material, inside information for his own personal gain.17  
In the second example, the officer was the beneficiary of a strong market, but 
never used her position in the corporation to aid her in personally gaining from 
the sale of the stock.  Equitably, it does not seem appropriate to punish the 
latter just because she had some good fortune.  Unfortunately for both parties, 
Section 16(b) holds them both liable for all “profits” realized in the transactions. 
 In fact, as is discussed later, the defendant in the latter case can be found 
liable for much more monetary damages than her actual taxable profits, unlike 
defendants with criminal intent in Section 10(b) cases.18 
 
II.  THE POLITICAL SETTING 
 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,19 to 
deal with issues relating to the sale and purchase of securities.  Section 10(b) 
of that Act provided, quite simply: 
 
[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or 
                                                                                                                         
(1975) and Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure and the National Markets in 
the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1473 (1986)). 
17  See e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).  The officer also has Williams Act and mail fraud 
liability as well.  See e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Piper 
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997). 
18  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). 
19  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (West 1997). 
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of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange . . . (b) to use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.  
 
However, with no definition of terms or official guidelines as to its use, § 
10(b) was little used for a decade.  Then Milton Freeman, who created it, 
speaking in 1967 at a conference on the codification of the Federal Securities 
Laws with Sumner Pike and the recently deceased Louis Loss on the panel, 
said: 
 
I think it would be appropriate for me now to make a 
brief  statement of what actually happened when 10b-5 was 
adopted, where it would be written down and be available to 
everybody, not just the people who are willing to listen to me. 
It was one day in the year 1943, 1 believe.  I was sitting 
in my office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received 
a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the 
Trading and Exchange Division.  He said, "I have just been on 
the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. 
Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about 
the president of some company in Boston who is going around 
buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders 
at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the 
company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are 
going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for the 
coming year.  Is there anything we can do about it?"  So he 
came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at 
Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them 
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in 
connection with the purchase or sale” should be, and we 
decided it should be at the end. 
 
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, 
and I don't remember whether we got there that morning or 
after lunch.  We passed a piece of paper around to all the 
commissioners.  All the commissioners read the rule and they 
tossed it on the table, indicating approval.  Nobody said 
anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are 
against fraud, aren't we?"  That is how it happened. 
Louis is absolutely right that I never thought that 
6
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twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had 
ever happened.  It was intended to give the Commission power 
to deal with this problem.  It had no relation in the Commission's 
contemplation to private proceedings.  Milton Freeman, 
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law 793, 922 (1967). 
 
Contrariwise, Section § 16(b) was specifically written as a strict liability 
statute intended “to prevent the abuse of the use of inside information by 
officers, directors, and more than 10% shareholders.”20  The legislature history 
of this section reveals that Congress intended it to be the main provision to 
stop insider trading.21 
 
Just one year after the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933,22 which 
regulated the initial issuance of securities, Congress became alarmed by 
certain types of stock trading by officers and directors of public corporations.23 
 It concluded that there was a need to restore the integrity of the stock market 
in order to encourage participation by the general public.24  Ordinary people 
                                                 
20  In Freedman v. Barrow, a federal court stated that by enacting the “short swing” 
profits provision of this section, Congress recognized that short swing speculation by 
large stockholders, officer and directors, all of whom might have access to inside 
information, would threaten the goal of section 16(b) “to insure the maintenance of fair 
and honest markets,” 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).  In Wagman v. Astle, 
the federal court stated that the purpose of Section 16(b) was to restore eroded 
investor confidence in the integrity of the stock market.  380 F. Supp. 497, 501 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).  The Court expressed the rationale that “it is unfair for some to profit 
in ways that others cannot.”  Id. 
21  See Wagman, 380 F. Supp. at 501. 
22  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994). 
23  See Susan A. Wetzel, Comment, New Rule 16b-3, the SEC’s Attempt to Aid 
Insiders by Revising Rule 16b is Much Ado About Nothing, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 125, 
128 (1998).  
24  Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation,  stated that the policy behind the creation of 
Securities Exchange Act was to "insure a fair and honest market, that is, one which 
would reflect an evaluation of securities in light of all available and pertinent data."  136 
F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943).  The court reviewed the background of the section and 
determined that “speculation by insiders, officers, directors and principal shareholders 
was a widely condemned evil,” according to the Hearings before Committee on 
Banking and Currency.  Id.  See also Hearings before Committee on Banking and 
Currency on S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and S. 56 and S. 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d 
Sess., 1934.  The court concluded that the only solution which the framers deemed 
effective for this action was “the imposition of liability based upon an objective measure 
7
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who bought and sold shares were being disadvantaged by the fact that 
“insiders”25 were in a position to find out valuable information concerning their 
own company’s stock before it was known to the public and use this information 
to make a profit.  Having defined such public policy, Congress took the step of 
imposing strict liability upon those officers, directors and ten percent 
shareholders who transacted certain “short” sales of the issuer’s securities.26  
The end result Congress desired was the elimination of the unfair practice 
known as “insider trading.”27 
 
 III.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
 
While the intent of Congress was the restoration in the faith and 
integrity of the stock market, the following issues soon arose in conjunction with 
the new Section 16(b).  Many of these stemmed from the language used in the 
                                                                                                                         
of proof.” Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 235. 
The court cited Mr. Corcoran's testimony, a chief spokesman for the draftsmen and 
proponents of the Act, wherein he stated, "You hold the director, irrespective of any 
intention or expectation to sell the security within six months after, because it will be 
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you 
have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of 
having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short 
swing.”  Id.  The court confirmed its position by noting that had Congress intended that 
only profits made by the misuse of inside information would be recoverable, it would 
have said so.  Id. at 236.  Therefore, because Congress did not limit the recovery to 
profits gained by the misuse of information, neither would the Court.  See Id. at 237. 
25  Initially defined as officers, directors, and those owning over 10 per centum of a 
corporation’s stock. 15 U.S.C. §78p(a) (1994). 
26  See Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks:  Rethinking Section 16, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1997).   
27  Wetzel, supra note 23, at 127 & n.14, noting that a 1915 New York Times survey 
showed that 90% of business executives interviewed admitted to trading regularly in 
their own corporation shares.  See also HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
STOCK MARKET  2 (1966).  However, there is some contrary belief as to the actual 
intention of Section 16(b).  See generally Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Section 
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183 (1992) (proposing that 
Section 16(b) was actually intended to prevent market manipulation, because insiders 
have the ability to artificially move stock prices by trading on their privileged 
information); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16:  Regulating the Management of 
Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991) (stating that the Act’s purpose 
was to discourage manipulation of corporate affairs to create opportunities to trade 
corporate stock profitably, since insiders generally invest for the long term). 
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section and others from the interpretations which courts made when defining 
it.28 
 
Section 16(b) entitles the issuer, or a security holder bringing suit on 
the issuer’s behalf, to recover short swing profits realized from the purchase 
and sale by a subject insider of such issuer’s equity securities within a six-
month period.29  Basically, it prohibits insiders from making a profit on 
transactions in their company’s securities when the purchase and sale of the 
securities both occurred within a six-month period.  Section 16(b) is controlled 
by an irrefutable presumption that the profits gained by the insider were 
produced unfairly.  Therefore, insiders must disgorge any profits realized in this 
type of short swing transaction and return the profit to the company.  This 
disgorgement controls irrespective of the purchasers actual intent.30 
 
Section 16(c) prevents insiders from profiting from downturns in the 
price of their corporation’s securities by prohibiting short sales “against the 
box.”  In a short sale, the seller does not actually own the stock.  Instead, the 
seller borrows stock, generally from his or her broker, and sells it in the market. 
 The seller must at some later time replace the borrowed securities by 
purchasing replacement securities in the market.  The seller engages in short 
selling in the hope that the market price will decline because the replacement 
securities may be purchased at a lower price than those initially sold (the 
borrowed securities), thus creating a profit.  Section 16(d) and Section 16(e) 
exempt certain transactions from the overall coverage of Section 16.31   
                                                 
28  Section 16 has two primary subsections which set out its requirements and 3 
additional ones which limit the Section’s overall scope.  Section 16(a) places 
requirements on certain statutorily defined insiders to report to the SEC their beneficial 
stock interests.  Section 16(a) defines those insiders which are subject to the 
requirements as “every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more 
than 10 per centum of any class of an equity security (other than an exempted 
security) which is registered pursuant to section 78(1) of this title (section 12 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934), or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of 
such security.”  Pursuant to Section 16(a), these defined insiders must file an initial 
report when their company’s securities are registered under Section 12 or within 10 
days after becoming statutory insiders.  Following the initial report, insiders must file 
transaction reports by the tenth day of the month following any month in which there 
has been a substantial change in their ownership, and they must also file annual 
statements of beneficial ownership with the SEC.  See generally, Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994). 
29  15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994). 
30  See id. 
31  Id. §§ 78p(d), 78p(e). 
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A.  Standing 
 
One particular issue was the fact that a person suing to disgorge a  
“short swing” transaction did not have to be a shareholder at the time that the 
alleged illegal transaction took place.32  The only step the plaintiff had to take 
in order to obtain standing was to be an “owner of [a] security” of the “issuer” 
when he filed the complaint.33  He did not even have to be a shareholder at the 
time of the trade.34 
 
Section 16(b) thus still makes it easy for a party to bring an action 
against an insider who has violated Section 16(b) for five distinct reasons.  
Specifically, Section 16(b) provides that a plaintiff in a Section 16(b) suit must 
be the owner of a “security” of the issue corporation.35  A “security” for 
purposes of Section 16(b) includes warrants, convertible debentures, bonds, 
puts, calls, and a variety of other financial instruments.36  This expansive 
determination of what a “security” entails for purposes of Section 16(b) 
increases the chances of a party having a means to achieve standing to bring 
a suit against an insider. 
 
Second, the plaintiff can be either the “record” or “beneficial” owner of 
a subject security.37  This point confers standing on a wide array of potential 
plaintiffs.  Then, the plaintiff need only own the security at the time he institutes 
the suit against the insider, not at the time of the purchase and sale by the 
insider.38 
                                                 
32  See id. § 78p(b). 
33  Id.  See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and 
Regulatory Construction of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 38-55 (1992). 
34  See 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1994). 
35  Id. 
36  See generally S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also  Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994). 
37  See generally Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).  See 
also 15 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1994).  See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 709 (3d ed., 1996) (stating that “nowhere in Exchange Act is the concept 
of beneficial ownership explicitly defined and therefore its scope has been limited to 
judicial interpretation and administrative rulemaking.”). 
38  See Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 
U.S. 919, (1957); see also Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. 
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Moreover, there are no restrictions in terms of either the number or 
percentage of shares or the value of such securities that must be held by the 
plaintiff.39  This plaintiff could purchase one share of stock, allege that there is 
a Section 16(b) violation, and properly bring a suit.  Finally, case law makes it 
even easier by granting attorneys’ fees to attorneys who represent successful 
plaintiffs, thus eliminating the cost of litigation for the plaintiff.40  
 
B.  Champerty and its Residue 
 
Other key issues concerning this statute are the use of contingent fees, 
champerty and solicitation.  A contingent fee is “a charge made by an attorney 
dependent upon a successful outcome in the case and is often agreed to be a 
percentage of the party’s recovery.”41  Champerty is an agreement between an 
attorney and his client in which the attorney is essentially the real party in 
interest in the client’s suit and pays the costs in return for a large portion of the 
damages awarded.42  Startlingly, although champerty is a violation of the Model 
Rules of Professional Responsibility,43 and state law,44 a defense of champerty 
in a Section 16(b) cause of action is not permitted.45 
 
In a related sense, there also is an issue of solicitation in Section 16(b) 
lawsuits.   Attorneys who understand the lenient standing requirements may be 
                                                                                                                         
denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954). 
39  Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123 (1991). 
40  See Gilson v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d on 
reh’g en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964). 
41  BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (4th ed. 1996).  Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 369 
(2d Cir. 1990) (“ absent fraud or overreaching, courts must enforce such private 
contingency fee agreements, which are, after all, embodiments of the intentions and 
wishes of the parties. . . .”). 
42  See generally, 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS  4286-89 
(3d ed. 1992). 
43  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) (1998).  Contingent fees are an 
exception to Rule 1.8(j).  Id. Rule 1.8(j)(2).  See generally Rule 1.5(c). 
44  THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 391 & 19, 389 & 3 (3d ed. 
1996) (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1999)).  “Most statutes are 
based in whole or part upon the American Law Institute’s Uniform Securities Act.  
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT, 7B U.L.A. 509-687 (1985 and Supp. 1988). 
45  See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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inclined to solicit potential clients or, in the alternative, “create” clients to sue 
for a Section 16(b) violation.46  Although solicitation in some respects has been 
upheld by the Courts, such as in an advertising context,47 a question arises 
whether it is appropriate in the context of Section 16(b).   
 
Since Section 16(a) requires that an insider report any trades involving 
his company’s stock to the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is a simple 
project for a clerk to comb through these publicly accessible reports in order to 
find a “violation.”  Then the attorney can solicit “a plaintiff,” so that, in essence, 
the attorney enforces Section 16(b) and receives sizable fees for his work.  
The corporation actually pays this fee since it, in theory, has received a 
“benefit” from attorney, i.e., the legal services that resulted in the recovery from 
the insider who had no culpable intention.  Of course, the net profits of the 
corporation and the shareholders book value, are reduced by these fees.   
 
Cases have held that the attorney is entitled to a “reasonable” fee for 
the services rendered.48  The question is – is that fee justified for the amount of 
the work done?   
 
In a typical scenario, the attorney finds both a violation and a plaintiff, 
and then writes a demand to the company for the enforcement of Section 
16(b).  If the insider returns the profit to the company without further legal 
action, the attorney still is entitled to a substantial percentage of the recovery.  
The plaintiff receives a minuscule amount in relation to the attorney fees 
awarded.  In one case, the individual plaintiff received only $1.10, and the bulk 
                                                 
46  Indeed, the plaintiff “shareholder” in several § 16(b) suits was the owner of the 
newstand in the plaintiff’s attorney’s building lobby.  One district court held 
“unbelievable (his) own testimony that he had cash funds adequate to pay (fees)” 
noting the lack of any bank accounts or sign of wealth . . . .”  Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 
618, 619 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963).  See also Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that “in-person solicitation for pecuniary 
gain” does not warrant First Amendment protection as does advertising in the Bates 
case, infra note 48); see also, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. 
Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that a lawyer is free to place a newspaper 
advertisement intended for luring a specific group of people as her clients). 
47  Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that there can be no 
restriction on truthful advertising and this restriction would be a violation of the First 
Amendment). 
48  See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1998) (for 
determining “reasonableness”); see also Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 777 P.2d 
394, 395-96 (Okla. 1989) (basing an analysis of the “reasonableness” of attorney fees 
on twelve discussed factors). 
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of the award went to pay attorneys fees.49 
 
This creates a “misincentive” for the attorney.  Obviously there are 
minor costs to search through Securities and Exchange Commission records 
and find a violation, which should be compensated if there is a recovery for the 
plaintiff and the corporation, but should it not be reasonable?   
 
This scenario also perpetuates the public’s hostile view of attorneys.  
Attorneys appear to have an excessive incentive to litigate merely for the fees 
involved; not to right a true “wrong” or help a truly aggrieved plaintiff recover a 
loss to which he may be entitled.  The public perception of lawyers is already 
extremely negative and surveys have shown a consistent dissatisfaction with 
the legal profession as a whole.50  This Section 16(b) situation hurts the image 
of attorneys and the legal profession in general.  It is doubtful that this result 
was envisioned by the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 
C.  Elements of the Lawsuit 
 
Since the 1930's, the federal government has developed a framework 
of criminal and civil laws designed to prevent corporate insiders from profiting 
in the securities markets on the basis of nonpublic material information.51  
Cases involving Section 16(b) have generally focused on the definition of 
“sale” or “purchase,”52 the definition of a “security,”53 and what roles in a 
corporation are considered “insider positions.”54  Regrettably, there have been 
only a few cases on the identity of the plaintiff or the appropriateness of the 
fees awarded to the attorneys.55   
                                                 
49  Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956). 
50  See Barbara Rosen, Simple Things You Can Do Everyday to Improve Your Image, 
PA. LAW, Jan. 1994, at 22. 
51  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
52  See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323-24.  The process of starting a suit has a 
shareholder of the issuer asking the issuer to require the insider to disgorge the 
profits.  Id. at 1324.  If the issuer fails to do so within 60 days, then the shareholder 
may file a suite to compel disgorgement.  Id. at 1324-25. 
53  See generally Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). 
54  See generally Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 38, 69-78. 
55  See e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 
1016 (1954); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F.Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).  See generally 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative 
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An initial reading of Section 16(b) leads a reader to believe that Section 
16(b) should be an effective tool to deter insiders from trading on non-public 
information.  The most striking benefit is the fact that Section 16(b) does not 
require any proof as to the intent of the purchaser/seller in successfully finding 
a violation under Section 16(b).  In other words, it is a strict liability statute.56  
The only proof that the rule requires for a successful prosecution is that the 
insider bought and sold corporate securities within a six-month (“short swing”) 
period.57  Therefore, if an insider trades within the six-month period he is liable 
no matter what his excuse for making the trades. 
 
D.  Let’s Stop Calling Them “Profits” 
 
“Profit” calculations for insider trading are formulated so as to insure 
that the highest amount of money will be disgorged from the insider.  For 
purposes of finding a violation under Section 16(b), it is irrelevant whether the 
purchase precedes the sale or vice versa.58  As the Second Circuit stated, “the 
only rule whereby all possible profits can surely be recovered is that of lower 
price in, highest price out within six months.”59   
 
However, no such definition of  “profit” can be found in any other 
accounting or economic theory.  In essence, the statute allows recovery of 
much more than the real, taxable gains made by the defendant.  This is a 
severely punitive result especially when the defendant had no scienter or 
criminal culpability.  Contrariwise, a defendant with criminal intent in a Rule 
10b-5 case can be fined and “profits” are calculated in a traditional accounting 
context. 
 
To facilitate this maximum “profit” calculation, Section 16(b) does not 
even combine all of the transactions within a six-month period to determine 
whether an insider has a cumulative profit.60  Instead, it matches the absolute 
                                                                                                                         
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).  See also Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 
F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968), (citing Smolowe v.  Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 
1943)). 
56  Wetzel, supra note 23, at 133. 
57  Id. 
58  See 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994). 
59  Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 239; see also Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 
1951). 
60  Taylor, supra note 26, at 1317. 
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lowest purchase prices with the actual highest sales prices to calculate the 
moneys to be repaid.  As a result, an insider61 could actually have a cumulative 
loss during a given six-month trading period and still be required to pay 
“profits” back to the corporation.  The following example illustrates this point. 
 
Assume that an insider enters into the following transactions: 
 
1) Buys 100 shares on 1/2/00 @ $100/share 5) Sells 100 shares on 
3/3/00 @ $105/share 
2) Buys 100 shares on 1/12/00 @ $70/share 6) Buys 100 shares on 
4/1/00 @ $110/share 
3) Sells 100 shares on 1/21/00 @ $120/share 7) Buys 100 shares on 
4/3/00 @ $90/share 
4) Sells 100 shares on 3/2/00 @ $75/share 8) Sells 100 shares on 
5/2/00 @ $150/share 
 
When calculating the punitive damages owed in the above transactions, 
the purchases and sales which produce the highest spread are put together, 
notwithstanding whether the sale preceded the purchase or the purchase 
preceded the sale.  Therefore, the “profit” calculations of the insider’s 
transactions are as follows: 
 
Purchases                                   Sales                             Profit   
 100 @ $ 70 (#2)  100 @ $150 (#8) $8,000 
 100 @ $ 90 (#7)  100 @ $120 (#3) $3,000 
 100 @ $100 (#1)  100 @ $105 (#5) $   500 
 100 @ $110 (#6)  100 @ $ 75 (#4) $       0 
 
Under this scenario, the statutory “profit” made by the insider during 
these transactions is $11,500, whereas his actual, taxable and accounting 
profit would be $8,000.  This larger amount is what the insider is required to 
repay under Section 16(b).  This is a system which no longer needs to exist 
when Section 10(b) allows a comprehensive look at culpability.  The Smolowe 
and Gratz cases were decided before Rule 10b-5 litigation developed.  The 
facts in these cases should turn on intent – not strict liability. 
 
E.  The Appropriate Role of § 16(a)     
 
                                                 
61  The effectiveness of Section 16(b) regarding a 10% beneficial owner is not as 
concrete as the other statutory insiders.  A beneficial owner may be liable under 
Section 16(b) only if he owned more than 10% of the stock at the time of the purchase 
and at the time of the sale.  Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 
419 (1972). 
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Section 16(a)62 provides for a thorough system to facilitate disclosures 
of information regarding insider holdings and trades.63  This information 
produces insight for the market as a whole and the regulatory authorities as to 
appropriate conduct by insiders.  Corporations and their counsel have 
developed extensive training and counseling systems to admonish affected 
persons of the illegality of insider trades and proper techniques under which 
such trades may be made.64  Attendant publicity about those prosecuted for 
such violations as well as a vigorous SEC enforcement division using Rule 
10(b)565 give society adequate protection against these evils. 
 
F.  Omitted Defendants 
 
Section 16(b) is underinclusive in that it does not include all employees 
who may have valuable inside information and trade.66  A non-officer employee 
or outside consultant to a corporation who makes a large, real accounting profit 
within a six-month statutory period will not be required to disgorge profits under 
Section 16(b). 
 
Section 16(b) also is underinclusive with regard to the type of securities 
that are applicable to Section 16(b).  Section 16(b) only applies to insiders of 
corporations whose equity securities are registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67  The requirements of Section 12 mean that 
those are large publicly held corporations.  However, many companies are not 
registered or not required to register under Section 12.68  Section 16(b) has no 
application to these corporations and has no ability to discourage officers of 
these entities from engaging in insider trading, a material weakness of the 
                                                 
62 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994). 
63  Section 16(a) provides that a person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10 per 
centum of any class of equity security, or who is an officer or director of the issuer of 
the security, must file a registration statement with the Commission within ten days 
after they become a beneficial owner, officer, or director.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994). 
64  Such cautionary memoranda also are required by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 99 Stat. 1264. 
65  17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1997). 
66  Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323. 
67  Section 12(b) requires registration when a security becomes listed on a national 
securities exchange.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) 
(1994).  Section 12(g) requires registration when the issuer has more than $1,000,000 
in assets and at least 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (1994).  But see 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1997) (modifying Section 12(g)(1) to exempt from the registration 
requirement any issuer with assets not exceeding $10,000,000). 
68  Taylor, supra note 26, at 1323. 
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statute.  In short, the same conduct by the CEOs of two major corporations is 
treated differently.   
 
Another problem is the statutorily defined transaction period.  Section 
16(b) only applies to sales and purchases which both occur within a six-month 
period.69  Congress apparently believed that the six-month period would 
capture virtually all transactions in which there might be an opportunity to profit 
from the use of inside information.70  However, despite Congress' belief, the 
application of Section 16(b)'s statutory transaction period produces an 
overinclusive effect.  Since the period does not inquire into whether a trader, in 
fact, used inside information, but instead sets an arbitrary time period during 
which profits are prohibited,71 traders are prosecuted even if they do not trade 
on inside information, so long as they traded within the six-month period. 
 
Furthermore, Congress' reasons for creating the six-month period do 
not seem to be relevant in today's markets.  In 1934, six months was an 
adequate time period with which to make sure that the inside information 
became known to the general public.  Today's extraordinary era of 
instantaneous mass communication calls for a considerably shorter time 
period.  Furthermore, there is a large corps of market analysts who are vigilant 
in their search for information about the companies which they follow.  These 
developments, together with SEC rules requiring companies to provide more 
forward looking information,72 make it substantially more difficult to keep 
information secret for extended periods of time.  The statutorily defined period 
is too long as it stands, and as such, poses a problem in its application. 
 
G.  Omitted Plaintiffs 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has no authority to enforce § 
16(b) as it does with other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.73  By only 
allowing the corporation or individual shareholder plaintiff to sue, Congress 
                                                 
69  15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994). 
70  Taylor, supra note 26, at 1324 & n.35. (citing to the Committee on Federal 
Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, 
Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 BUS.  LAW. 1087, 1130 (1987)). 
71  Id. at 1323.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
72  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 u-4 (West 1997)) and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. Co. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 77p, 77bb (West 1997 and Supp. 1999)). 
73  See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
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created enforcement through "private attorneys general."74  Now that § 10(b) 
and its Rule 10(b)5 have been interpreted so broadly, it is time to place the 
burden where it belongs: on the SEC. 
 
Section 16(b) also is unlike other statutes in that the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 does not apply.75  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23.1 states that, in a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders to 
enforce the right of a corporation which has failed to enforce the right, the 
complaint must be verified and allege “(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or 
a member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains.”76  In a 
Section 16(b) action all that is required is that the shareholder be an owner of 
the security at the time he initiates the suit and maintain that status throughout 
the pendency of the lawsuit.77  
 
In reality, there are situations in which the corporation changes its 
identity.  For instance, in a case in which the defendant corporation merged 
with another corporation during litigation, the question arose whether the 
plaintiff shareholder still had standing to sue for the short swing transactions 
done by those associated with the subsidiary.78 
 
In that case, the Court interpreted the category of shareholders 
involved in initiating a Section 16(b) suit, as those who have a “financial stake” 
in the litigation.  A stockholder of the issuer claimed that there were shares 
traded in violation of Section 16(b).  However, that corporation was acquired by 
Viacom and the shareholder's stock in the issuer had been exchanged.79 
 
The court held that the shareholder could maintain the suit even 
though the company’s stock no longer existed since it was acquired by another 
                                                 
74  Coffee, supra note 55, at 669. 
75  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.  A complaint by the shareholder against the corporation shall 
allege that (1) plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction in 
question; and (2) the action is not a “collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of 
the United States which it would not otherwise have.”  Id.  Additionally, complaint shall 
allege “with particularity” the reason(s) why the shareholder is taking action and 
reasons(s) why she represents the interst of “similarly situated” shareholders or 
members.  Id.  
76  Fed. R. Civ. Pro  Rule 23.1 (West Group 1997). 
77  Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1979).   
78  Gollust v.  Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1991). 
79  Id. at 118-19. 
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corporation.80  The Court discussed Congress’ intent to put "a private-profit 
motive behind the uncovering of this kind of leakage of information, [by making] 
the stockholders [its] policemen,81 and quoted draftsman Thomas G. Corcoran, 
while testifying before the House committee, who stated that Congress could be 
confident that Section 16(b) would be enforced because the enactment of the 
statute would "[say] to all of the stockholders of the company, 'you can recover 
any of this profit for your own account, if you find out that any such 
transactions are going on.’”82 
 
The intent behind the provision that not only the corporation may 
initiate a suit, but that a stockholder would be able to take action if the 
corporation fails to do so, stems from the premise that if an officer, director or 
more than ten percent shareholder chooses to violate Section 16(b), he must 
be aware that someone with a profit motive will try to find out and initiate a 
lawsuit.83  It appears that Congress, by granting standing of this considerable 
magnitude, wanted to ensure that many possible plaintiffs would be able to 
initiate a suit if needed, in order to deter insider trading of this sort. 
 
In Gollust,84 the Court held that because the plaintiff received shares in 
the parent corporation, he still maintained a financial interest in the outcome 
even after the merger.  The court concluded that any finding of wrongdoing by 
the insider would force them to turn in profits to the new corporation. Thus, the 
shareholder who now had an interest in the new corporation, would stand to 
profit, albeit indirectly.85 
 
This decision may limit the broad standing requirement by excluding 
those who are security holders of an issuer involved in a cash-out merger.86  
After a cash-out merger the shareholder no longer has a financial interest in 
the outcome of the litigation, as required by the Gollust Court.  Due to the fact 
that the shareholder could not profit from the recoupment of the money, he 
                                                 
80  Id. at 129. 
81  Id. at 124-25; (citing Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1934) 
(testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran)). 
82  Id. at 125 & n.7. 
83  Gollust, 501 U.S. at 125 & n.7. 
84  501 U.S. 115 (1991), aff’g, 909 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1990). 
85  See id. at 112. 
86  See Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 33, at 41. 
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should be denied standing.87 
 
IV.  BALANCING THE SCALES – ARE THERE STILL MEANINGFUL “BENEFITS” TO § 16(B)? 
 
While it is the position of this paper that there are major problems 
associated with Section 16(b) and its enforcement, it seems also that the points 
initially thought of as benefits to preventing insider trading can also be 
considered problems.  For example, while the concept that a shareholder's 
attorney can be awarded his fees under  Section 16(b) sounds beneficial 
because it may help encourage a reluctant shareholder to bring a Section 
16(b) suit against an insider, such fees steer the focus away from preventing 
real culpable insider trading, and promote unethical dealings between client 
and lawyer. 
 
Second, while strict liability seems like a benefit if insiders are deterred 
from engaging in insider trading because of the ease with which they may be 
found to be in violation of Section 16(b), the Act only includes the statutorily 
defined insiders and on a higher level corporate leaders and applies even if 
the defendant did not trade on insider information. 
 
V.  THE CAMEL UNDER THE TENT:  UNFORSEEN RESULTS OF SECTION 16(B) 
 
A.  The Setting:  How Fees are Set:   
 
There are several proper methods for attorneys to obtain fees for their 
legal services, the major ones being through a fee agreement or retainer or on 
a contingent fee basis.  A retainer is the advancement of payment to an 
attorney for his legal services.  Contingency fees are based on the premise 
that the client will pay the attorney a percentage of the recovery if the outcome 
is successful.  Such an agreement includes the work done by the attorney, but 
does not usually cover the out-of-pocket cost of litigation, for example court 
costs and discovery expenses.  The client remains ultimately liable for these 
expenses.  The overlap with champerty, the practice where the attorney seeks 
to recover his fee for legal services and the expenses he incurred by 
advancing the cost of the law suit himself, are clear. 
 
An attorney’s fee may be contingent on the outcome of a matter for 
which his service is rendered, except in a matter for which a contingent fee is 
prohibited, such as criminal and domestic cases.88  A contingent fee agreement 
must be in writing and state the method by which the fee is to be determined, 
                                                 
87  See id. at 42. 
88  MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, EC 2-20 (1981); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (d) (1998). 
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including the percentage that will be paid to the lawyer in the event of a 
settlement, trial or appeal.  Other expenses are to be added from the 
recovery.89  Contingent fee agreements are permitted in the civil context.  
However, the advancement of expenses is precluded in many jurisdictions.90 
 
Under traditional rules, the company pays the plaintiff's attorney's fees 
when the attorney confers a benefit on it in the form of the recovery of profits 
from the insider.91  It is considered a windfall for the corporation.92  In one case, 
the corporation recovered nothing, but still had to pay the attorney’s fees, even 
though no benefit was conferred upon it.93 
 
There are generally two ways to calculate the attorney's fees. The first 
is the "lodestar method," which compensates the attorney at his or her hourly 
rate, based on the time expended on the action.94  This method of 
compensation has the drawback of encouraging the attorney to work more 
leisurely, thus running up the fee.  Also, if there are disputes regarding the 
hourly rate of billing, the court will essentially have to determine whether the 
rate is fair and whether the time spent on the matter is reasonable, which uses 
up already scarce judicial resources.95 Another drawback is that if the attorney 
spends enough time to find the violation and a plaintiff merely sends a demand 
letter prompting the insider to pay the profits without further action by the 
attorney, his hourly rate may not compensate for his time and effort.  (The time 
the attorney  spends searching for a security law violation is not attributable to 
the company that receives the benefit.)96  This takes away the incentive for the 
attorney to monitor Section 16(b) violations, which is not what Congress had in 
                                                 
89  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (c) (1998). 
90  See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects 
of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws  of 
General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 443 (1988). 
91  See Shlensky v.   Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 1978). 
92  See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943). 
93  See id.  See also Gilson v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 
1964). 
94  See e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated after remand 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 
1976).  Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976). 
95  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 38. 
96  See id. 
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mind when it wrote Section 16(b).97  However, this method may be more fair to 
the corporation, especially if the amount of legal work is not substantial. 
 
Another method of compensating attorneys for their efforts is to award 
them a percentage of the corporation’s recovery.98  Often, there is a recovery 
for the corporation, and the attorneys receive a large fee award, often for a 
minimal amount of work.99 This is partially due to the way the statute is 
designed, since if all of the elements are met, there is generally no defense 
and the insider will have to turn over the profits.100   
 
The individual plaintiff and other shareholders usually receive a 
minimum benefit in relation to the amount of the attorney fees.101  While this 
has the effect of encouraging attorneys to monitor and enforce Section 16(b) 
violations, which is what Congress had in mind to police and deter insider 
trading,102 the downside is that it encourages the attorneys to seek out a 
violation and find a plaintiff merely for the fees involved.103  This results in 
overenforcement and opportunism by attorneys, which creates a negative 
image of the legal profession in the mind of the public. 
 
B.  The Dilemma – Crossing The Line 
 
Due to the relaxed standing requirement of Section 16(b), it has 
become a widespread practice of attorneys to either solicit shareholders of the 
corporation in which the short swing transaction occurred or to ask friends or 
family to purchase securities of the corporation in order to obtain standing and 
have the attorney provide their legal services.  This rule creates an impetus for 
attorneys to pursue private enforcement of the securities law.104   
 
There is an incentive for the attorney to prosecute suits that may not be 
meritorious or may be of little value to the shareholder or the company, simply 
                                                 
97  See generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 677-98. 
98  See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 (1984). 
99  See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943). 
100  See generally Coffee, supra note 55 at 677-98. 
101  See Smowlowe, 136 F.2d at 241. 
102  See id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
103  See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956) 
104  See Portnoy v. Gold Reserve Corp., 711 F.Supp. 565, 569-70 (E.D. Wash. 1989). 
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to stimulate attorney fees.105  In many of these cases, the attorney's financial 
incentive is the sole motivation for enforcement of Section 16(b). 
 
The attorney basically becomes an entrepreneur or a "bounty 
hunter,"106 not just an enforcer for an aggrieved or injured client or a deterrent 
to illegal conduct.107  This situation allows a chance of opportunism and 
overenforcement on the part of the attorney.108  The attorney generally has a 
low search cost in relation to the amount of money that he or she can make 
from these cases.109  There is no defense to a violation, which basically makes 
this an ideal situation for the attorney.  All the attorney must do is find a 
violation and a plaintiff, prove the elements of Section 16(b), and he has a fee. 
 
One could argue that if the attorney does not have a motive (a 
substantial fee) to search out violations and enforce them on behalf of a client, 
who will do so?  Since most potential plaintiffs own stocks through mutual 
funds, where they probably don't even know the names of the individual stocks, 
they will not take action to enforce Section 16(b).110  It is likely that most small 
                                                 
105  In Portnoy, a United States District Court, stressed the need for the attorney's role 
before recovery of fees.  The corporation already had begun an investigation into an 
alleged §16(b) violation by the time that the plaintiff shareholder's letter notifying the 
corporation of the possible short swing transactions arrived.  Id. at 566-67.  The court 
noted that the corporation had informed the shareholder that it was pursuing the claim 
and waiting for a determination on the exact amount to be recovered.  Id. at 566.  
However, after the sixty-day waiting period had expired the shareholder brought a 
derivative action to recover the illegal short swing profit.  Id. at 567. 
A few days later, the corporation notified the shareholder that it had secured 
the profits and settled the matter.  Id.  Thereafter the attorney for the shareholder 
requested the court to award him attorney's fees in prosecuting the action.  Portnoy, 
711 F. Supp. at 567.  The court denied his claim, stating that "an award is equitable 
only if the attorney's services were a substantial or motivating factor in the 
corporation's recovery in the illegal profit," and in this case he was not because the 
corporation had informed the shareholder that it was pursuing the alleged violation.  Id. 
at 569. 
106  See 15 U.S.C. §78u-1(e) (1994).  For SEC procedures relating to bounty hunter 
provisions, see 17 C.F.R. §§201.61-201.68 (1997). 
107  See generally Coffee, supra note 55. 
108  Id.   
109  Id. 
110  See generally Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack , United States v. O'Hagan and 
Private Securities Litigation Reform:  A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 
1207-1217 (1998). 
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investors have no idea that they can bring action against the insider.  Even if 
the small investor were aware, it is unlikely he would have the time, interest, or 
sophistication to do so.  This is especially so considering the small monetary 
benefit to the individual shareholder.111  Shareholders with a substantial 
interest in a company rarely try to enforce Section 16(b).112  If the corporation, 
which is more than likely aware of the trades involved, does not care to take 
action against the insider, no one is left to do so.113 
 
However, new federal legislation allowing private causes of action for 
contemporaneous trader involving insider trading provide a clear consistent 
framework for enforcement in this field.  The major problem of Section 16(b) or 
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 is solved as well.  Champerty is eliminated.  The 
defendant must have scienter, and the SEC or individual plaintiff is allowed to 
recover if a violation of Rule 10(b)5 is proven.  Thus, Section 16(b) has 
essentially become moot, or at worst, much more of a problem than a solution. 
 
 VI.  THE POOR PLAINTIFF 
 
A.  Where’s the Money? 
 
Since attorneys receive large amounts for their fees and the 
shareholder who is supposed to be the one with an interest in the litigation 
usually does not really increase his personal equity, is the purpose of this act 
being accomplished?. 
 
The extreme disallocation of any proceeds can be extraordinary.  In 
one case the attorney was awarded $3,000 for fees and $78.98 for expenses 
to be paid by the corporation.114 The recovery against the defendants was 
$18,894.85.115  The plaintiffs were only benefitted by about $3 since they 
owned only 150 shares out of 800,000.116 
 
In another case, the plaintiff shareholder sought to increase his 
personal equity by $1.10 if the Section 16(b) action was successful,117 while if 
                                                 
111  See generally id. 
112  See Magida, 231 F.2d at 847. 
113  See id. at 848. 
114  Smowlowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d. Cir. 1943). 
115  Id. at 240. 
116  Id. 
117  Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d. 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1956). 
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he were unsuccessful he would be responsible for costs and expenses adding 
up to many hundred times that amount.118  Subsequently, in a later action the 
attorney petitioned the court for an allowance of 50 percent of the recovery.119 
 
The court noted that the services rendered by the attorney were both 
necessary and beneficial to the corporation; however, it was found that this 
amount was excessive.  As a result, the court granted an allowance of $12,000, 
approximately one quarter of the total amount recovered, which it felt was fair 
and adequate to cover his services.120 
 
It was argued that this would be unfair considering the discrepancy 
between what the attorney received as a benefit versus what the actual plaintiff 
received. However, in the Court’s  reasoning it stated that the corporate issuer 
is the one who usually brings forth the action and only upon its refusal or delay 
does the shareholder have the right to act.121  The Court reasoned that a 
stockholder who is successful in maintaining a Section 16(b) action was entitled 
to reasonable attorneys' fees because it was the corporation which had 
received the benefit of the attorney’s work and, therefore, should pay for such 
a benefit.122  Since the corporation is the one which has received the benefit, it 
must pay for the services. 
 
An arguable question which arises is what is the purpose of having a 
shareholder plaintiff?  The only ones really benefitting are the corporation and 
the private attorney who worked on the case when the corporation failed to do 
so.  In some cases the attorney is the only one who benefits because, while the 
corporation may receive the proceeds of the short swing profit due to the work 
of the attorney, it also has to pay out large sums for attorney's fees and costs.   
 
For example, in one case a court granted the attorneys $750,000 in 
fees but the amount recovered was $7,920,000.123  Originally, the attorneys 
petitioned for $2,500,000; however, the court found this to be unreasonable.  It 
decided that the notion that a fee based primarily on a percentage of the 
recovery exceeded the limits of reasonable compensation for the attorney's 
                                                 
118  Id. 
119  Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
120  Id. at 783. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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efforts.124 
 
It seems as though whether you are a bonafide shareholder or a friend 
who has bought into the action, the court is not interested.  As long as the 
corporation receives a benefit from the attorney’s work, the theory is that every 
shareholder receives a benefit.  An example of this is where a case settles 
before going to trial and the attorney cannot even account for all of his time 
spent on the case.125 
 
When the issue of avoiding trial has arisen, the courts have been willing 
to award more than one third the amount of recovery in attorney's fees simply 
because the case settled.126  One court awarded $10,000 in fees to attorneys 
in relation to work done on the case, even though they could not show the 
actual amount of time spent.127  The court based its reasoning on the fact that 
the fees were reasonable and fair, based on the results achieved by the 
intervention of counsel.128 
 
Also, under circumstances when the attorney has merely aided in the 
discovery of short swing profits, attorney's fees have been awarded.  In Gilson 
v.  Chock Full O’Nuts Corporation,129 the Second Circuit allowed an award to an 
attorney who had merely brought the violation of Section 16(b) to the attention 
of the corporation, who later brought suit.130  The case was appealed from the 
United States District Court which dismissed the complaint for attorney’s fees.  
The Court of Appeals cited Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, which recognized 
that reimbursement of attorney's fees was required by equitable 
considerations.131 
 
One of the problems with identifying champertous agreements is the 
question of whose interest is being pursued. For example, when an attorney 
enters into a contingent fee agreement the attorney is highly motivated 
                                                 
124  Id. at 163. 
125  See id. at 164. 
126  Blau v.  Kagan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92, 119, at 96,561 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 8, 
1968). 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  326 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.  1964). 
130  Id. at 248. 
131  Id. 
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personally to win the case and receive a share of the judgment. If the client has 
paid the costs, the attorney maintains the client's interest in pursuing the case, 
so that he may profit only from judgment, but not be motivated to prosecute the 
action solely to obtain his fee. 
 
Technically in a champertous agreement, the attorney puts his interest 
first because he has more at stake. Not only is the attorney trying to win the 
case to receive his share for the work that he has performed, but he needs to 
recoup the money that he has put out for costs.  Therefore, the shareholder 
becomes the vehicle through which the attorney initiates the case and recovers 
fees. 
 
In this latter arrangement, the shareholder is no longer relevant after 
the case has begun, because the needs which the attorney seeks to address 
are his own. This practice is held to be unethical.132  The rules relating to ethics 
state that an attorney shall not acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of 
action or litigation.133  It has been argued that the attorney has put himself in a 
position of primary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the 
litigation that he is conducting for the client, when he has based his fee on the 
success of the case. 
 
In addressing this issue the courts have balanced the interests of the 
corporation's many shareholders versus the self-seeking attorney. The Court 
in Magida v Continental Can Company stated, 
 
Presumably Congress is aware of the opportunity presented to 
attorneys to suits for their benefit, but apparently it regards 
public policy against proved and repeated violations of 
fiduciary responsibility by corporate offices at the expense of 
the public more detrimental to public good than the violation of 
generally accepted ethics by attorneys.134   
 
Thereby, it set the standard that champertous agreements would not be a 
defense to Section 16(b) actions, but, if proven, would only be pertinent to the 
determination of the amount of the award granted to the attorney.  Since courts 
are willing to award attorney's fees even in cases where counsel has acted 
unethically,135 it is possible to see how attorneys may take great steps to 
                                                 
132  See generally Gabaldon, supra note 88, at 466-69. 
133  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.8(j) (1998); MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1981). 
134  Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
135  See. id. 
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become involved in Section 16(b) actions. After all, even if they act 
inappropriately, their actions are not a defense to the action. Further, the only 
harm they may suffer is a reduction in the amount of fees they receive.  
Tragically, the issue of impropriety becomes irrelevant. 
 
B.  Solicitation 
 
One key problem with Section 16(b) is that solicitation of legal 
representation by an attorney from existing holders of securities violates long-
standing established principles.136  The rules on professional responsibility 
state that a lawyer shall not, except in some permitted forms of advertising, 
recommend employment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or 
associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice regarding the 
employment of a lawyer.137 
When this issue has arisen, the judicial attitude has been that the ends 
of Section 16(b) enforcement justify means that may involve technical 
improprieties. In fact, courts have uniformly held that an attorney's solicitational 
acts may be grounds for disciplinary action, but will not suffice as a defense for 
a Section 16(b) action.138 
 
Thus, attorneys who read a report filed with the SEC may try to solicit 
those who own shares of the corporation to initiate an action, since it is the 
attorney who receives a fair share of the recovery.  Attorneys may even ask 
friends, family or employees to buy shares, thus giving them standing, and the 
attorney employment on the case. 
 
In Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Incorporated,139  the court stated the policy 
for such a conclusion 
 
We do not suggest that counsel fees should be automatically 
awarded to overzealous attorneys; nor do we want lawyers 
poring over Section 16(a) reports as soon as they are made 
public to find a cause of action before the corporation does 
and thereby collect a fee. Reimbursement for information 
leading to corporate recovery will be allowed only if the 
corporation has done nothing for a substantial period of time 
after the suspect transactions and its inaction is likely to 
                                                 
136  See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1981). 
137  Id. 
138  See Gabaldon, supra note 88 at n.87. 
139  389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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continue. In this way, it is not speed but careful investigation 
which will be rewarded, and the corporation will have adequate 
opportunity to enforce its rights without prodding from a 
stockholder. But if the corporation has been, and is likely to be, 
inattentive to its rights, a portion of any recovery should 
properly go to the stockholder for reimbursement of any 
reasonable legal expenses.140 
 
Another issue is that of soliciting an intimidated or co-conspirator 
employee, family member or friend to buy into the action.  While a lawyer may 
be considered to have an attorney/client relationship with a close friend or 
relative resulting merely from advice given, it is unlikely that “advice,” in this 
context, includes asking a friend or family member to buy into a cause of 
action.  This type of solicitation usually translates into the attorney acquiring an 
interest in the litigation, since it is not the friend or relative who has any interest 
in the outcome of the action.  The attorney is the only one who really stands to 
benefit by receiving his fees. 
 
 VII.  PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
 
It is argued that repeal is needed in this area of securities law 
enforcement for three reasons.  First, proper theories exist to meet Congress’ 
intent.  Second, society needs to curb the excessive and unnecessary litigation 
that is rampant in this area of the law.  Third, the bench and bar should help to 
restore the badly tarnished image of attorneys and the legal profession. In 
order to cause changes in this area of the law, it is necessary to examine the 
circumstances that make it possible for attorneys to indulge in unnecessary 
litigation merely to collect fees. These circumstances involve the issue of 
standing of the plaintiff. 
 
The standing requirements of Section 16(b) are quite broad in relating 
to securities laws.  This is evident by the fact that a person can obtain standing 
by acquiring the stock after the alleged trade has taken place, and such a 
person does not need to own any certain amount of shares to initiate the suit.  
One share of stock is enough to confer standing.141 
 
Further, Section 16(b) states that "any security" will be adequate to 
confer standing.142  Examples of such securities include stocks, notes, 
                                                 
140  Id. at 473. 
141  Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 127 (1991). 
142  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
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warrants, bonds, debentures, puts, calls and others.143  The only restriction is 
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has 
a maturity at the time of the issuance not exceeding nine months.144  Due to the 
ease with which a person can become a party to the suit, amending the law 
may be the only alternative to cure the ongoing abuse by plaintiff’s attorneys. 
 
There are several theories with which to amend Section 16(b). They 
include: (1) eliminating private causes of action, (2) banning contingent fees, or 
(3) changing the category of possible plaintiffs by requiring them to be 
shareholders at the time of the trade. In the alternative, the decision in United 
States v. O'Hagan145 may set the standard, thus repudiating the need for 
Section 16(b) at all. 
 
A.  Eliminate Private Causes of Action? 
 
Under Section 16(b) a shareholder may initiate a suit for insider trading 
sixty days after notifying the corporation, if the corporation fails to act.  By 
virtue of this rule, all the shareholder has to do is wait the sixty days and then 
initiate his suit to recover the short swing profits. Attorneys, as discussed in the 
section above, use this time to investigate and research, all of which may lead 
to the discovery of a violation of Section 16(b). They are compensated for all 
work done, which facilitates the recovery of short swing profits. 
 
In the best scenario to justify the lawyer’s role, the corporation fails to 
act within the sixty-day period and the attorney initiates the law suit, increasing 
the amount of compensation he receives for the return of profits by the insider 
proprietary figure.  If an insider is taking advantage of his position and making 
illegal trades, why not allow the interested shareholder to seek him out and 
make him divulge any profits made? 
 
While in theory this sounds ideal, reality is that the shareholder is 
usually not the one with real interest in retrieving those profits. It is the 
attorneys who facilitate the suit. They are the ones who profit from the initiation 
of a law suit.  By eliminating private causes of action, attorneys would not be 
able to take advantage of the lenient standing requirement. There would be no 
involvement of private attorneys for the sake of retrieving short swing profits. 
                                                 
143  THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 408 & n.1 (3d ed. 1996) 
(stating that “[t]he registration requirement [of securities] is set forth in section 12(g), 
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (1994).”).  See generally Donald A. Scott, Checklist for Registration 
of Securities under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 BUS. 
LAW. 1631 (1981). 
144  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994). 
145  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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While this approach may seem unfair, many other securities laws give 
the enforcement of such laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Section 16(b) is one law which Congress chose not to give such authority.  
Since 16(b) requires the shareholder to notify the corporation first, Congress 
may have thought that the issue would be settled internally by the corporation. 
The fact that it allowed the shareholder to take action sixty days after notifying 
the corporation may have been to simply put a threat on the corporation.   
 
In many of the cases, when the corporation fails to take action within 
time allotted, and the shareholder initiates a suit, the case settles before 
litigation.146  This may be a reflection of what was intended, a quick resolution if 
the corporation failed to act on its own. The notion of plaintiff attorney's fees 
was never even considered by Congress. There is no mention in Section 16(b) 
of attorney's fees. 
 
The courts have developed their own standard for determining what are 
reasonable attorney's fees. Had Congress known how widespread this practice 
of receiving attorney's fees for private causes of action, it may have granted 
the SEC the power to enforce Section 16(b) violations. 
 
Another possibility is for Congress to allow the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to enforce Section 16(b), instead of private plaintiffs.  There are 
two ways that this could be accomplished.  The first method would be to simply 
allow the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce Section 16(b) 
instead of private plaintiffs.  If violations were pursued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission only, instead of private plaintiffs, there would be no 
attorney fees to be collected.  A flat percentage of the recovery, such as twenty 
percent, could be paid out of the recovery to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to fund the enforcement. This would leave the corporation with the 
majority of the recovery, although that fee may not cover the actual cost of 
recovery by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  This would eliminate 
the lucrative plaintiff's bar that has developed in this area.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission would be as aggressively motivated in seeking out 
violations as would a private attorney with a monetary incentive.  It also has the 
financial resources to do so. 
 
Thus, the solution may lie in vesting the power to enforce Section 16(b) 
                                                 
146  See DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL, 265 (6th ed. 1998) 
(stating that usually, a favored defense tactic to obtain a dismissal of derivative actions 
is to create a committee of “disinterested” directors.  If, when this committee decides 
that it is not in the “best interest of the corporation” to maintain this action brought 
forth by a shareholder, it asks the court to dismiss the action.  Therefore, in many 
cases settlement results before litigation occurs.) 
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violations in the SEC.  By allowing the SEC to be the enforcer of such 
violations, the shareholder would not have the burden of paying the costs of 
the suit in cases where the corporation has failed to act.  Furthermore, the SEC 
would not have a personal stake in the outcome of the case.  This may insure 
an unbiased representation of the shareholder in retrieving short swing profits. 
 Lastly, this is another alternative which may cure ongoing abuse by attorneys. 
 
B.  Allow Champerty as a Complete Defense? 
 
To allow a complete defense of champerty would defeat the purpose 
and intent of Congress in effectuating the enforcement of Section 16(b).  Even 
though an individual plaintiff would not receive a large increase in the value of 
his or her stock and the attorney would receive a significant amount, to allow 
otherwise would control the enforcement of Section 16(b). 
 
If Congress were to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 or Section 10(b) 
contemporaneous trade standard, so the plaintiff must be the owner of any 
security of the issuer at the time of the alleged insider trading and at the time 
that the suit is instituted, it would solve a major weakness in the statute.  This 
would make finding a willing plaintiff more difficult since the number of possible 
plaintiffs is limited to only those who had a genuine interest in the company, 
which would cut down on the number of Section 16(b) actions undertaken. 
Also, this would reduce the number of actions that were pursued only for the 
interest of the attorney who found the violation, as it would require more work 
on the part of the attorney to find a willing plaintiff. 
 
In conclusion, if Section 16(b) were amended to grant the SEC the task 
of enforcing Section 16(b) insider trading rather than private parties, this could 
well cure the problem of overzealous attorneys.  
 
Attorney’s fees would still provide the main stimulus for enforcing 
Section 16(b), but it would now require the attorney to find a "real” plaintiff, not 
one who purchased the stock after the short swing trading merely in order to 
benefit him or herself. This would provide a balance between the opposing 
interests involved. The attorney still has the opportunity to generate fees by 
pursuing Section 16(b) violations, but this will further the intent of Congress in 
encouraging private enforcement. The prosecution of Section 16(b) may drop 
slightly, but the ones not pursued would be the type of actions to be 
discouraged.  There will still be a large recovery for the attorney, but he or she 
will have to travel further to reach it. 
 
C.  Change the Standing Tests? 
 
Another requirement under Section 16(b) is that the plaintiff must be 
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the "owner of any security."147  The term "any" share has been found to mean 
at least one share.148  Other cases have held that there is no restriction on the 
number of shares, the percentage of shares, or the value of the share(s).149  
This results in potential plaintiffs with a very minimal interest in a company, who 
have the power to enforce Section 16(b).150  The requirement of allowing a 
plaintiff standing who only owns a negligible number of shares seems 
unreasonable.  To require more shares or a larger percentage of shares would 
still allow small shareholders who are truly aggrieved to enforce Section 16(b).  
The problem of how many shares remains.  However, the current requirements 
for standing creates a situation that may be exploited to the detriment of the 
legal profession. The standing requirement of a minimal number of shares 
combined with the requirement that the plaintiff need only have an interest at 
the time the suit is instituted, has resulted in a situation where attorneys can 
seek out a violation, find a plaintiff to buy a single share, and enforce Section 
16(b) solely to earn a fee. 
 
D.  Modify Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1? 
 
A possible solution to cure the problem of attorney solicitation of 
current shareholders and friends or family who purchase shares to obtain 
standing, may be to require the shareholder to own their shares at the time of 
the alleged inside trade.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 states that, in a derivative action 
brought by one or more shareholders to enforce the right of a corporation who 
has failed to enforce the right, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege 
"(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or a member at the time of the 
transaction of which the plaintiff complains."151   
 
Modifying Section 16(b) to include Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 could prevent 
the fabricated cases which arise with overzealous attorneys. If the statute 
required contemporaneous ownership then, only those stockholders who had 
shares in the corporation at the time of the alleged trade would have standing, 
thus reducing the number who would have standing. 
 
This would eliminate the practice of attorneys soliciting friends or family 
to buy into these actions.  Shareholders who purchase shares of the 
corporation after the alleged trade has taken place would not be able to bring 
                                                 
147  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
148  Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 127 (1991). 
149  Id. at 123. 
150  See id. at 125-26. 
151  FED. RCIV. P.23.1. 
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suit on behalf of themselves and the other shareholders. 
 
Denying an after-the-fact shareholder the right to sue because he was 
not a shareholder at the time the trade appeared does not contradict the policy 
behind Section 16(b), which was designed to allow legitimate plaintiffs to initiate 
a suit for the good of the corporation as a whole.   The corporation thus 
remains the primary beneficiary of the disgorged funds.   
Thus, requiring plaintiffs to be shareholders at the time of the trade 
appears to be the solution to attorney impropriety. 
 
E.  Eliminate Certain Types of Attorneys’ Fees? 
 
Section 16(b) does not specifically provide for the granting of attorney’s 
fees. Courts have held that fees are justified in the majority of cases, for 
several reasons; first, fee awards may be the sole stimulus for the enforcement 
of Section 16,152  and second, if the corporation receives a recovery, a benefit 
has been conferred on it,153 and it should pay the reasonable value of the 
services that resulted in the recovery. 
 
This leaves the amount of the fees as the major issue.  In Gilson v. 
Chock Full O'Nuts, the court held that "equitable considerations require the 
corporation to pay a reasonable attorney's fee.”154  In Smolowe, the court found 
that "since in many cases such as this the possibility of recovering attorney's 
fees will provide the sole stimulus for the enforcement of Section 16(b), the 
allowance must not be too niggardly."155  It appears that the attorney fees 
should be particular to each specific case, since the work required for each 
one may differ as far as effort, difficulty, and time expended. It would be unfair 
to deny an attorney payment for his services that conferred a benefit on 
another.   
 
This would chill the enforcement of Section 16(b).  However, the fees 
should be reasonable (in other words, not excessive) in light of the 
circumstances of each particular case.  Shareholders generally do not have 
the money to institute the suit. Attorneys have become the force behind the 
initiating and pursuing of these suits.  In cases where attorneys have asked a 
friend or co-worker to buy shares to obtain standing, it would be unlikely for 
                                                 
152  Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing Smolowe v. 
 Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). 
153  See id. at 474. 
154  Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964). 
155  Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 4, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss4/1
2000] WEAPONS TO FIGHT INSIDER TRADING 
 
their attorney to then ask for a retainer to pursue the case that they created in 
the first place. 
 
Another solution to the problem of attorney interest may be to eliminate 
contingent fee arrangements. If a shareholder wished to investigate a possible 
Section 16(b) violation, he would have to obtain the services of an attorney 
through a retainer agreement. This would eliminate the solicitation by attorneys 
who ask friends to purchase shares to secure standing, since those who 
purchased the shares to allow the attorney to pursue the case would not be 
willing to pay for the suit. 
 
This would eliminate abuses by attorneys who have a self-interest in 
Section 16(b) actions, but not affect those shareholders who honestly want to 
initiate a suit based upon a Section 16(b) violation.  In this circumstance, the 
shareholder who has discovered a possible short swing trade would still be 
able to pursue the case. 
 
Moreover, the court has the final determination on whether to award 
attorney's fees. In most cases, only where the attorney's work has been a 
motivating factor in the recovery of profits and where their work has 
substantially benefitted the corporation will the court award attorney's fees, 
thereby placing conditions on whether to grant fees for the work performed. 
 
The court also has in its discretion the power to reduce the amount of 
the fees sought by the attorney who litigated the action.156 In cases where a 
compromise has been reached as to the amount the insider will furnish to the 
corporation, the parties can stipulate to the dismissal of the action and 
attorney's fees.  Although this amount is not binding on the court, the court 
may ask the SEC for an opinion on the appropriateness of the award 
requested. 
 
Ordinarily, the SEC makes a recommendation as to how much it 
believes the attorney should receive in fees. In some cases the court does not 
follow either proposal. For example, in Blau v. Brown & Western Nuclear, 
Incorporated,157 the parties stipulated to an amount of $11,250 for attorney's 
fees.158  The SEC recommended $3,800 or ten percent of the recovery and the 
court awarded $7,500.159  In another case, the parties agreed to $3,000 in 
attorney’s fees.160  While the SEC suggested $1,000, the court awarded 
                                                 
156  See generally Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 332 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
157  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,263, at 97,253 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1968).  
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
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$1,800, twenty percent of the recovery.161 
 
This area presents difficulty because a set formula would be unfair to 
some attorneys, and a percentage of the recovery would be unfair to a 
corporation for what little legal work was done.   The matter of fees is individual 
to each case and they are often excessive, but the solution is for courts to use 
an increasing percentage of the recovery based on the time and the difficulty 
of its collection.  The court would have to determine what a reasonable plaintiff 
in the field of securities litigation would pay an attorney on an hourly basis and 
estimate the reasonable number of hours that an experienced attorney would 
need to complete the recovery. 
 
The reasonable hourly rate would be calculated based on the 
geographical area, skill, difficulty of the work and factors as those found in the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  This option has several drawbacks. 
First, the court would be put in the position of monitoring the current market 
rate for attorney fees, which would take up judicial time.  Theoretically, the 
required reasonableness of the fees based on the amount of the work actually 
done should reduce the number of attorneys who pursue a Section 16(b) 
violation simply to run up excessive fees. This may reduce the incentive for 
private enforcement of these violations, but if there were truly an un-addressed 
violation, an attorney would still be able to be paid at his usual hourly rate, as 
long as it was reasonable. 
 
It seems arguable whether the courts have truly balanced the windfall to 
plaintiff’s attorneys versus the small recovery for the shareholder.  One theory 
concerning the contingent fees is that only cases are brought which have 
merit.162  Attorneys will assess the chance of the suit’s success before 
instituting the suit, based on the premise that in the event that it is not 
successful, they will not be paid. However, the reoccurring danger exists of 
whose interests are being pursued. 
 
The courts have effectively addressed this issue and placed the value 
of recovery in Section 16(b) cases higher than the self-interested attorney. It is 
not to say that the impropriety of plaintiff’s attorneys does not exist, but the 
courts have decided that the inherent goal of Congress in enacting Section 
16(b) for the good of the public outweighs all else. 
 
                                                                                                                         
160  Blau v. Berkey Photo, Inc., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,264, at 97,255 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 4, 1968). 
161  Id. at ¶ 97,256. 
162  See Gabaldon, supra note 88, at 459. 
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However, the elimination of contingent fee arrangements would not 
disregard Congressional intent. Section 16(b)'s silence on the matter of 
attorney's fees, leads to the conclusion that Congress may have thought that 
since the law was written bestowing strict liability on those who violate it, there 
would not be much litigation. They may have thought that if the insider did not 
turn over any profit made within the six-month period, the corporation would 
ensure that the profit was disgorged. However, because attorneys' fees are not 
mentioned in the statute, leads to an argument that they should not be 
awarded. 
 
F.  Eliminate Section 16(b) Altogether? 
 
Section 16(b) has been criticized for several reasons.163  The first is 
that it only applies to a defined group of directors, officers, and beneficial 
owners.164  Section 16(b) does not apply to others within the company who may 
have access to valuable information.  It also applies to the defined group, who 
may not even have access to information, but may still be penalized for trades 
not motivated by inside information. 
 
Second, Section 16(b) applies only to insiders of equity securities 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.165  It does not apply 
to insiders of corporations that are not required to register, even though those 
insiders may engage in short swing trading.166  Another criticism of Section 
16(b) is that it does not require an insider to use inside information, but only 
considers whether the trades were within a six-month period and whether a 
profit may be calculated.  Actually, this discourages insiders from owning 
securities issued by their company.167  Contrariwise, it does not affect trades 
that are outside the six-month window, even if they were motivated by inside 
information.168   
 
One possible solution is to eliminate Section 16(b).  There are other 
sources169 which prohibit the use of inside information in securities trading, 
                                                 
163  See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1318-19. 
164  See id. at 1322-26.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
165  See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
166  See id. 
167  See Taylor, supra note 26, at n.34. 
168  Id. at 1324. 
169  See id.  E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). 
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most of which are more efficient and fair to both the insiders and the trading 
public. 
 
Two of these are Section l0(b) and Rule 10(b)5.170  Section l0(b) is a 
general fraud provision, which in conjunction with Rule 10(b)5 prohibits the use 
of material inside information when trading securities, until that inside 
information has been made available to the public.  
 
These provisions apply to all interstate securities sales and purchases, 
regardless of the time frame, and not just to corporations that are required to 
register under the Securities Act of 1933.171 
 
An insider violates Section l0b-5 if he trades in the securities issued by 
his company on the basis of material information that is not available to the 
public.172  This section applies not just to traditional insiders such as officers 
and directors, but to people who may have access to inside information by 
having an indirect connection with the company, such as attorneys, 
accountants, and others who are temporarily connected with the corporation.173 
 These people are considered 
fiduciaries.174 
 
In order to be found in violation of Rule 10(b)5, an insider must have 
been in a fiduciary relationship with corporation.175  Until recently, this meant 
that the person had to have a relationship with the company or the 
                                                 
170  Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that, "It shall be 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or any facility of any national 
securities exchange -- to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on the securities exchange or any security not so registered, 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.  15 
U.S.C. § 78j (1994). 
171  See id. 
172  Taylor, supra note 26, at 1328-29. 
173  United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997). 
174  Id. 
175  See id. at 617-18. 
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shareholders, thus establishing the duty.176 
 
In 1980, the Supreme Court found that a printer, who traded on 
nonpublic information gained in conjunction with his employment, had no 
fiduciary relationship that required him to disclose information.177 
 
In 1997 the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. 
O'Hagan.178  There, an associate in a law firm, retained to represent a 
company in an acquisition, became aware that a major tender offer was 
forthcoming.  The associate purchased options in the securities in the 
corporation he acquired and made a substantial profit.  The associate was 
convicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and money 
laundering.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because it found that 
the associate had no relation to the corporation and, therefore, had no duty to 
it.  The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that even though the associate 
had no duty to the corporation, he still had a duty to his law firm, even though it 
had resigned from the case before the offers were conducted.179 
 
This 'misappropriation’ theory holds that a person commits fraud ‘in 
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) 
and Rule l0b-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for securities 
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.  In 
lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between a company insider 
and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory 
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who 
entrusted him with access to confidential information.180 
 
By comparison, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 concentrate on singular 
securities, while Section 16(b) focuses on controlling a particular class of 
transactions. 
 
The Court also noted that an insider who secretly converts the 
principal's information for personal gain, defrauds the principal.  Further, the 
next requirement that needs to be proven, that the trade was “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security,” is satisfied when without disclosure to 
                                                 
176  See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
177  See id. at 235. 
178  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
179  See id. at 653. 
180  Id. at 652. 
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the principal, the insider uses the information to purchase or sell securities.181  
Even more noteworthy, is that the holding includes not only officers, directors, 
and other permanent insiders of the corporation, but also attorneys, 
accountants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of the 
corporation.182 
 
In the Section 16(b) situation, where an insider uses information he 
obtained due to his position and profits, he is deemed to have defrauded the 
corporation because there was a certain relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of the corporation and the insider. Therefore, the 
corporation, as well as the investing public, are harmed by his actions. It is this 
reason that the 1934 Congress enacted Section 16(b) in the first place, to try 
to preserve this sense of trust. When the insider uses this information to 
purchase or sell securities without informing the corporation, (including all 
shareholders) the second element is met, that of "in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security." 
 
In essence, the Rule 10(b)5 statute now is held to condemn (1) using of 
any deceptive device, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 
in contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission.183  The 
misappropriation theory permits the imposition of liability to a person who 
trades in securities for their personal benefit.184  By using material, confidential 
information without first disclosing it to the public, the insider breaches the duty 
of loyalty and confidentiality, he owes to the principal.185 
 
With United States v.  O’Hagan,186 the Court may have declared the 
final word on all insider trading.  There may no longer be a need for two 
standards. All inside traders can be dealt with under the misappropriation 
theory.  The Court held that criminal liability under Section 10(b) may be 
predicated on the misappropriation theory. 
 
Thus, the advantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to control 
insider trading makes it easier to focus on the facts of an individual situation, 
rather than finding a whole class of securities trades improper. This would allow 
                                                 
181  Id. at 656. 
182  Id. at 652.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
183  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651. 
184  See id. at 652. 
185  See id. 
186  117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). 
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the plaintiff (or the Securities and Exchange Commission) to determine whether 
the trades were actually motivated by inside information. This has the 
advantage of allowing short swing trading by insiders when the trades are not 
motivated by inside information, but on personal financial situations, such as 
family situations, other investment opportunities, or unexpected bills, etc. 
These sections also have the advantage of not being applicable only to public 
corporation or statutorily defined insiders, since the laws are applicable to more 
trades which would advance Congress' intent in reducing insider trading. 
 
One disadvantage of using Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)5 to combat 
short swing insider trading is that it is more difficult to prove liability,  which, in 
turn, makes for more expensive and time consuming litigation, thereby using up 
already strained judicial resources.  Another drawback is that Rule 10(b)5 does 
not impose liability for trading on inside information unless there is a breach of 
fiduciary duty. This requirement would make it more difficult to prosecute short 
swing insider trading, but it is possible that the statute could be changed 
slightly to accommodate this. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Insider trading continues to be an issue today.  Those insiders who 
transact in short sales and who do not divulge their profits to the corporation 
are sought out and forced to return the profits.  Whether it is a shareholder of 
the corporation who initiates the suit or an overzealous attorney who finds out 
about the trade and encourages a friend to purchase the security to obtain 
standing, one thing is clear, the insider will forfeit the profits if he violates 
Section 16(b).187 
 
Section 16(b)188 permits litigation merely for the sake of attorneys’ fees, 
and it may not be as effective as other statutes in deterring and monitoring 
insider trading. While it is clear that this area of the law needs to be changed, 
the question of exactly how to change it without defeating the intent of 
Congress regarding the enforcement is a difficult one. 
 
One key method of controlling excessive litigation would be to allow the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce Section 16(b),189 which would 
remove the incentive for attorneys to aggressively pursue violations.   
 
Another method would be to eliminate Section 16(b)190 entirely and use 
other statutes already in place to control short swing insider trading. 
                                                 
187  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
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Amending Section 16(b)191 to eliminate private causes of action, 
contingent fees or adding the contemporaneous ownership requirement of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1192 to this section may also help.  It has been argued that 
allowing the SEC to initiate suits where the corporation has failed to, may be a 
solution which would solve many of the existing problems.  The SEC could 
pursue these suits, thereby eliminating the reward of large sums of the 
returned profits to the attorney.  In the alternative, O'Hagan193 may become the 
standard in cases dealing with insider trading. 
 
Whatever the final result may be, there continues to be an ongoing 
problem of attorney impropriety in relation to Section 16(b) actions. If the intent 
of the Congress was to restore the integrity of the stock market and eliminate 
insider trading, then the O'Hagan194 decision may be the best solution. 
 
This paper has examined the statutory section of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b),195 and attorney impropriety, an unforeseen 
issue which arose due to the relaxed standing requirements.  The courts have 
weighed this problem with the overall purpose of Section 16(b) and found in 
favor of public policy. The reward to attorneys who do the job that should have 
been done by the corporation is too large a price to pay for the “benefit” 
conferred on the corporation and its shareholders. 
 
                                                 
191  Id. 
192  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. 
193  See supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text. 
194  Id. 
195  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 1994. 
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